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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 William Scott Demint timely appeals from the district court’s judgment of 
conviction following his conditional guilty plea to trafficking in methamphetamine and 
unlawful possession of a firearm. In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Demint asserted that the 
district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found during a search of 
the enclosed bed of his truck. In response, the State claimed that Mr. Demint did not 
preserve the ground for suppression on appeal. The State also claimed that the district 
court did not err by denying his motion. This Reply Brief primarily addresses the State’s 
claim that Mr. Demint’s argument is not preserved. To the contrary, Mr. Demint’s 
argument is preserved for review, and it should prevail on appeal because there was no 
probable cause for the warrantless search of Mr. Demint’s enclosed truck bed. 
  
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Demint’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
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ISSUE 





The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Demint’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 The State makes two arguments in response to Mr. Demint’s contention that the 
district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. The State claims that Mr. Demint 
did not preserve his argument for appeal and that Mr. Demint’s argument fails on the 
merits. Each claim will be addressed in turn. 
  
A. Mr. Demint Preserved This Issue For Appeal 
 
 The State asserts that Mr. Demint did not preserve his argument for appeal 
because he argued in the district court only that there was no probable cause for the 
search, not that probable cause dissipated. (Respt. Br., pp.6–7.) It is clear, however, 
from the arguments made in the district court that this is a distinction without a 
difference. The fact that trial counsel did not use the precise wording used by appellate 
counsel does not mean that the issue is not preserved for appeal. Thus, this arbitrary 
distinction made by the State between no probable cause and dissipated probable 
cause has no bearing on the issue raised in the district court and now properly before 
this Court on appeal. 
 “Appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories, and arguments that 
were presented below. Issues not raised below generally may not be considered for the 
first time on appeal.” State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 367 (Ct. App. 2015) (citations 
omitted). The appellant “cannot argue more grounds for that challenge [to a search] 
than were argued before the district court.” Id. Here, Mr. Demint argues the same 
ground to challenge the warrantless search of the enclosed truck bed as was argued in 
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the district court—there was no probable cause to satisfy the automobile exception. 
Mr. Demint’s co-defendant argued: 
The facts in this case suggest that police did not have probable cause to 
believe that illegal narcotics would be found in the enclosed truck bed. 
Unspecified nervousness, coupled with the dog alert on the passenger 
compartment of the truck are not enough to justify the search of the truck 
bed.1 
 
(Aug. R., Mem. in Support of Mot. to Suppress Evidence, p.5.) Similarly, at the 
suppression hearing, co-defendant’s counsel reiterated her argument in her “initial 
briefing” to challenge “the validity of entering into all areas of the vehicle based on one 
dog search,” as well as stating additional arguments based on the evidence admitted at 
the hearing. (Tr. Vol. I, p.165, Ls.10–12, see Tr. Vol. I, p.152, L.6–169, L.4 (counsels’ 
arguments). During counsels’ arguments, the district court also stated, “It appeared to 
me that the question was whether the alert on the cab was sufficient to allowed [sic] a 
search on the bed.” (Tr. Vo. I, p.158, Ls.4–6.)  
 Now on appeal, Mr. Demint also argues that the police officer, Deputy Lowry, did 
not have probable cause to search the enclosed bed of his truck under the automobile 
exception. (App. Br., pp.5–14.) “Probable cause is established when the totality of the 
circumstances known to the officer at the time of the search would give rise—in the 
mind of a reasonable person—to a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found in a particular place.” State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706 (2012) 
                                            
1 The district court allowed Mr. Demint to join in the issues raised by the co-defendant’s 
motion to suppress. (Tr. Vol. II, p.13, Ls.10–16.) (There are two transcripts in the record 
on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, includes the hearings on Mr. Demint’s motion to 
suppress, the entry of plea, and sentencing. The record was then augmented with a 
second transcript, cited herein as Volume II, which includes a motion hearing held on 
February 24, 2015.) 
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(emphasis added). At the time of the search here—the moment Deputy Lowry opened 
the enclosed truck bed and directed the dog to go inside—there was no probable cause.  
 Mr. Demint framed this argument as a “dissipation” because it would be improper 
and disingenuous to argue that there was no probable cause from the outset. “A reliable 
drug dog’s alert on the exterior of a vehicle is sufficient, in and of itself, to establish 
probable cause for a warrantless search of the interior.” Id. In this case, there was no 
dispute that the dog alerted at the driver’s side door of the truck. (Tr. Vol. I, p.98, L.25–
p.99, L.10.) This alert gave Deputy Lowry probable cause to begin a search of the truck. 
But probable cause does not last indefinitely. Or in a vacuum. “As a corollary . . . of the 
rule that the police may rely on the totality of facts available to them in establishing 
probable cause, they also may not disregard facts tending to dissipate probable cause.” 
United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 567, 574 (9th Cir. 2005) (alteration in 
original) (citing Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1988)); see also 
Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706–07 (referencing Ortiz-Hernandez’s “concept” of “probable 
cause dissipation”). As such, Mr. Demint asserts that the dog’s single alert at the 
driver’s side door plus the additional information known to Deputy Lowry just prior to the 
search—namely, Mr. Demint’s nervousness, the unverified narcotics tip,2 the dog’s 
failure to alert inside the cab, the fruitless search of the cab, and the dog’s failure to 
alert around the truck’s exterior—was insufficient to establish probable cause to search 
                                            
2 Deputy Lowry was watching for Mr. Demint’s truck because he received information 
from narcotics police officers regarding a certain truck driving from Utah possibly with 
methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. I, p.87, L.20–p.88, L.1, p.112, Ls.7–24, p.122, L.17–p.124, 
L.18.) However, the State conceded at the suppression hearing that it was not relying 
on the narcotics tip to establish probable cause. (Tr. Vol. I, p.157, Ls.3–9.) Moreover, 
Deputy Lowry’s testimony at the suppression hearing provided no information on his 
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the enclosed bed. Whether this is phrased as a dissipation of probable cause or simply 
the absence of probable cause is irrelevant. Mr. Demint asserts that this ground for 
suppression is preserved for appeal, and he respectfully requests that this Court 
consider the merits of his argument. 
 
B. There Was No Probable Cause To Allow The Police Officer To Open The 
Enclosed Truck Bed And Direct The Drug Dog To Jump Inside 
 
 The State also claims that the district court did not err by denying Mr. Demint’s 
motion to suppress because the warrantless search of the enclosed bed was supported 
by probable cause. (Respt. Br., pp.7–13.) For the reasons stated in Mr. Demint’s 
Appellant’s Brief, the State’s arguments fail. (See App. Br., pp.5–14.) There is one 
argument by the State worth addressing, however. The State asserts, “[T]he Fourth 
Amendment does not require an officer who has probable cause to search an entire 
vehicle to correctly predict, on the officer’s first attempt, where in the vehicle the 
contraband may be located.” (Respt. Br., p.11.) The State essentially advocates for 
police officers to have carte blanche to search a vehicle until they discover the 
contraband that they suspect is inside, regardless of any new information that comes to 
light during the warrantless search. Such free rein to search is contrary to Anderson and 
United States Supreme Court precedent, which provides, “‘[P]robable cause may cease 
to exist’ when police ‘learn, for instance, that contraband is no longer located at the 
place to be searched.’” Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706 (quoting United States v. Grubbs, 
547 U.S. 90, 96 n.2 (2006)). Thus, although a drug dog’s alert establishes probable 
                                                                                                                                            
knowledge of the credibility or reliability of the source of narcotics tip. (See Tr. Vol. I, 
p.87, L.20–p.88, L.1, p.112, L.4–p.113, L.1, p.122, L.9–p.126, L.6.) 
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cause, it does not allow the police to ignore other relevant circumstances and search 
the vehicle without restraint.   
 Here, Deputy Lowry started with the dog at the back left brake light, but the dog 
did not alert until at the driver’s side door. (Tr. Vol. I, p.98, Ls.6–16, p.98, L.25–p.99, 
L.10.) Deputy Lowry and the dog then went inside the extended cab. (Tr. Vol. I, p.99, 
L.23–p.100, L.18.) The dog did not alert, and Deputy Lowry did not find any contraband. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.100, Ls.10–13, p.114, L.18–p.116, L.2, p.116, Ls.17–18, p.151, Ls.7–9.) 
After the search of the cab, Deputy Lowry took the dog around to the tailgate of the 
truck. (Tr. Vol. I, p.116, L.19–p.117, L.5, p.141, L.23–p.142, L.11.) Once at the tailgate 
of the truck, any probable cause to believe contraband would be found inside had 
dissipated based on the totality of the circumstances. The other relevant circumstances 
weighed against a determination of probable cause, including Mr. Demint’s compliance 
with the police’s requests, his valid license and no warrants, and the absence of any 
contraband in plain view or odors detected by Deputy Lowry. (See App. Br., pp.12–13.) 
Moreover, facts such as Mr. Demint’s nervousness have little significance in the overall 
determination of probable cause. (See App. Br., pp.9–11.) To be sure, if Deputy Lowry’s 
dog had alerted outside the truck bed, probable cause would have continued to allow 
the search of the truck. But the dog did not alert until Deputy Lowry directed the dog 
inside the bed. (Tr. Vol. I, p.100, Ls.1–3, Ls.22–23, p.101, Ls.2–4, p.145, Ls.15–16.) 
Thus, when Deputy Lowry opened the enclosed bed and directed the dog inside, 
Deputy Lowry engaged in an unlawful warrantless search of Mr. Demint’s truck. The 
district court should have suppressed the evidence found inside. See Wong Sun v. 
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United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (evidence obtained through unconstitutional 
police conduct subject to exclusion). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Demint respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s 
judgment of conviction, reverse the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, 
and remand this case for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 5th day of July, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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